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problem of increasing highway safety and reducing injuries and fatalities
on the nation's highways. The problem of nonuse of seat belts as a defense
in tort actions must be met with more than an eager intimation for legislative action 26 to make use mandatory and the easy disposition of a defense
on the basis of its being conjectural and thereby inadequate in law.

John Simon
The National Safety Council is in the process of drafting a model seat belt code
requiring the use of seat belts which it may distribute to state legislatures at their request
after its final approval. Conversation with Mr. Edwin Kirby of the National Safety
Council in Chicago, February 21, 1967.
26

TRUSTS AND ESTATES-DISPOSITIVE EFFECT OF PERSONAL
RECEIPT CLAUSES ON REMAINDER INTERESTS
Testatrix established a spendthrift trust wherein one half of the income
was to go to a friend for life with a remainder in testatrix's adopted son.
The will further provided that in the event the son did not live to collect
the remainder, it was to go to testatrix's brother and sister, or the survivor of
them. A spendthrift clause contained a statement that any payments were
to be made in person or upon the personal receipt of the beneficiary. The
adopted son, the brother, and the sister died before the remainder interest
could be distributed upon the death of the life tenant. The trial court held
that the personal receipt language of the spendthrift clause had no dispositive effect and ordered distribution to be made one half to the brother's
estate and one half to the sister's. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed
the trial court's holding. Northern Trust Co. v. North, 73 Ill. App. 2d
469, 220 N.E.2d 28, appeal denied, 222 N.E.2d v (1966).
The Illinois courts have held, in the three cases in which it was gn issue,'
that a personal receipt clause in a spendthrift clause had the effect of requiring the individual named in the remainder to be living at the termination of the life estate in order to claim the interest. The Illinois courts have
not been alone in this view. The four other states 2 which have considered
the effect of a personal receipt clause on distribution have likewise held
that the remaindermen must be alive at the termination of the life estate.
Northern Trust Co. v. North is therefore an important case in that it represents a marked departure in the effect given these clauses.
I Routt v. Newman, 253 111.185, 97 N.E. 208 (1912); First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v.
Cleveland Trust Co., 308 Ill. App. 639, 32 N.E.2d 964 (1941); Cowdery v. Northern
Trust Co., 321 Ill. App. 243, 53 N.E.2d 43, appealdenied, 326 I1.App. xiii (1944).
2

California, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Pennsylvania. Union Nat'l Bank of Pasadena

v. Hunter, 93 Cal. App. 2d 669, 209 P. 2d 621 (1949); Hemenway v. Hemenway, 171
Mass. 42, 50 N.E. 456 (1898); Barringer v. Gunderson, 81 Nev. 288, 402 P. 2d 470 (1965);
In re Nixon's Estate, 306 Pa. 261, 159 Atl. 442 (1932).

CASE NOTES

The purpose of this note is twofold: first, to examine the change in the
law of remainder interest brought about by this case and second, to examine writings and theories which may have contributed to this change in
position.
The Illinois courts first considered the effect of a personal receipt spendthrift clause in Routt v. Neu-man.3 In this case a widow attempted to get her
deceased son's share of the income of a trust through the administrator of his
estate. The court held that the interest of the son lapsed at his death because of the personal receipt spendthrift clause. 4 The court said: "The continued existence of the recipient of the fund was necessary to a compliance
with this requirement [the personal receipt spendthrift clause]". 5
This same principle was applied to a distribution of trust corpus in
First Nat'l Bank v. Cleveland Trust Co.6 The court cited the requirement
of the Routt case that the existence of the recipient of the fund was necessary to comply with a personal receipt spendthrift clause. 7 The court then
reasoned that payment to a deceased beneficiary, whether named in the
will or by the exercise of a power of appointment, could not be made in
person; therefore, the personal receipt spendthrift clause barred distribution to decedent's estate. In effect, the court held that the vesting of the
remainder interest was postponed until actual distribution by the personal
receipt spendthrift clause. 8 The court cited and applied the existence requirement of the Routt case again in Coudery v. Northern Trust Co." In
settling the question of whether accrued income should go to the estate of
the deceased beneficiary, the court held that distribution could not be made
to the estate because of the personal receipt spendthrift clause. 10
The position taken by the Illinois courts with respect to personal receipt
spendthrift clauses has been followed by the four other states which have
considered the question, two of which" quoted with approval from the
13
12
Routt case. The California Appellate Court cited Routt v. Newman'
3

Routt v. Newman, supra note 1.

4Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 29, Northern Trust Co. v. North, 73 111. App. 2d
469, 220 N.E.2d 28, appeal denied, 222 N.E.2d v (1966).

5Routt v. Newman, supra note 3, at 189, 97 N.E. at 210.
6First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Cleveland Trust Co., supra note 1.
7First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Cleveland Trust Co., supra note 1 at 655-56, 32 N.E.2d

at 972.
8 Brief for Appellant, p. 31, Northern Trust Co. v. North, 73 Ill.
App. 2d 469, 220
N.E.2d 28, appeal denied, 222 N.E.2d v (1966).

9Cowdery v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 1.
10 Brief for Appellant, p. 32, Northern Trust Co. v. North, supra note 8.

11 California and Nevada. See cases cited note 2 supra.
12 Union Nat'l Bank of Pasadena v. Hunter, supra note 2.
13 Routt v. Newman, supra note 1.
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and First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Cleveland Trust Co.14 and pointed out
that both cases held that payment to a decedent's estate, following his death
prior to the termination of the trust, was precluded because the personal receipt spendthrift clause showed an intention to limit the gift to the life of
the beneficiary. The court then said that the Routt and First Nat'l Bank
cases alone sufficiently sustained the conclusion of the court to deny payment to decedent's estate. 15
Nevada recently cited and followed the principle in the Routt and First
Nat'l Bank cases in Barringerv. Gunderson26 The court also quoted from
California Jurisprudence1 7 to the effect that the personal receipt spendthrift clause shows an intention to limit a gift to the life of a beneficiary
and prevents payment to his estate after his death.1 8 Also in accord with
this position is the Massachusetts case of Hemenway v. Hemenvay'9 and
20
the Pennsylvania case of In Re Nixon's Estate.
The position of the court in Northern Trust Co. v. North is a logical
extension of the view the court took in dictum in the earlier case of Costello v. Warnisher.21 This was a case dealing with whether a "bill of review" was the proper method to re-examine an agreement to sell trust assets by the trustee. As a peripheral issue, the appellant argued that the
personal receipt spendthrift clause would prohibit payment to the beneficiary's estate. In disposing of this contention, the court pointed out that
it had little relevancy to the issue in the case, but it then went further and
said that the clause must yield to the intention of the testator as derived
22
from the dispositive provision of the will.
Illinois has long held that a spendthrift clause without the personal receipt language has no dispositive effect. 23 The decision in Northern Trust
Co. v. North brings the treatment of spendthrift clauses with personal receipt language in line with the treatment of spendthrift clauses without
personal receipt language. The Illinois Appellate Court in McKeown v.
Pridemore24 cites the view of Professor Griswold that the chief justification
of spendthrift trusts should be the protection they furnish to a living beneficiary. Since the beneficiary cannot be protected after his death, Griswold
reasons that protection from a spendthrift clause should be allowed only
during the beneficiary's lifetime and thereafter the property should be held
First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Cleveland Trust Co., supra note 1.
15 Union Nat'l Bank of Pasadena v. Hunter, supra note 2, at 624, 209 P.2d at 624.

14

10 Supra note 2.

17 48 CAL. JUR. 2f, Trusts, § 127 (1959).

Ibid.
19 Supra note 2.
214 111. App. 2d 571, 124 N.E.2d 542 (1955).
23 McKeown v. Pridmore, 310 Ill. App. 634, 35 N.E.2d 376 (1941).
18

24

Ibid.

20
22

Supra note 2.
Ibid.
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liable for his debts. The court stated that it was in full accord with Gris25
wold's view.
The position taken by the Restatement 26 is in agreement with the court
in the McKeown case. The Restatement states that the executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased beneficiary of a spendthrift trust is entitled to accrued income from the trust if he would have been entitled to
27
that income were it not for the spendthrift clause.
The most cogent argument for treating a personal receipt spendthrift
clause the same as other spendthrift clauses insofar as remainder interests
2 s
are concerned is put forth by Griswold in his work Spendthrift Trusts.
Griswold acknowledged that there are some decisions that a spendthrift
clause prevents an estate from vesting. 29 He points out that there is no
basis on which such a conclusion can be supported as the mere restraint on
alienation has nothing to do with vesting. He concludes:
It [the power of alienation] relates only to the power to alienate the interest,
and the question whether that is 'vested' or not depends on the contingencies
that may affect the ultimate ownership of the interest-contingencies which do
not depend on the power of alienation. 0
In conclusion, it appears that Northern Trust Co. v. North represents a
significant departure from the effect personal receipt spendthrift clauses
are to be given in determining the disposition of remainder interests. In the
future, remainders are to be determined from the dispositive language of
the instrument regardless of whether there is a spendthrift clause with or
without personal receipt language.
Douglas Mitchell
26
Ibid.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 158(2) (1959).
27 Ibid.
28 GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (2d ed. 1947).
29 In his discussion Griswold cites Routt v. Newman, First Nat'l Bank v. Cleveland
Trust Co., and Cowdery v. Northern Trust Co. (Id. at 324).
30 GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFr TRUSTS, op. cit. supra note 28, at 323-24.
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USURY-REQUIRED PURCHASE OF INSURANCE
FROM CREDITOR-ILLINOIS ADOPTS
REASONABLENESS TEST
Defendant borrowed $25,000 from plaintiff and gave as partial security
a twenty-five year, five per cent mortgage note. As a condition precedent to obtaining the loan, defendant was required to purchase one of
plaintiff's life insurance policies and assign the policy to plaintiff as collateral security for the note. At the time of the loan, defendant had an
insurance estate, in policies with other insurance companies, with a face

